Wu-Tang Clan, Enter the Wu-Tang (36 Chambers)
Wu-Tang Clan, Enter the Wu-Tang (36 Chambers)
Defendant was indicted for the shooting death of Alyssa Ruggieri. Before sentencing, he signed a written waiver excusing him from appearing at the hearing. The victim's mother moved to compel defendant to be there. The trial court found defendant had no right to be absent and ordered him to appear. The Appellate Division affirmed. Defendant appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that a criminal defendant does not have an absolute right to be absent from his sentencing hearing. The trial court has discretion whether to accept a defendant's waiver. The trial court must balance the interests of the public, the victims, the State and the defendant. In this case, the Supreme Court found no abuse of discretion and affirmed.
On March 2, 2011, Graves was indicted for attempted possession of 500 grams or more of cocaine with intent to distribute, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B)(ii) and 21 U.S.C. 846. He was arraigned on March 31. The district court ordered a psychiatric examination and mental competency evaluation, 18 U.S.C. 4241(b). That evaluation was pending on June 3, 2011, three days before Graves’s trial was scheduled to begin, so the case was continued. On June 22, the Bureau of Prisons completed the report, concluding that Graves was competent to stand trial. The report was received on July 7. On September 21, 2011, the court ruled that Graves was competent to stand trial and appointed defense counsel, who moved for a continuance. The court set Graves’s trial date for February 27, 2012. Weeks after seeking the continuance, Graves moved to dismiss the indictment, claiming that more than 70 days of inexcusable delay had passed since the filing of the indictment, in violation of the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. 3161, the Sixth Amendment, and the Due Process Clause. The district court denied the motion. Graves was convicted and sentenced to 120 months in prison. The Third Circuit affirmed, finding no speedy trial violation.
Moreno, born in Mexico in 1971, was adopted by a U.S. citizen at age nine. New Mexico issued a birth certificate, indicating a birth place of Mexico. In the 1990s, Moreno was convicted of possession with intent to distribute a controlled substance and of false imprisonment. In 2006, she was deported, after an immigration judge, the Board of Appeals, and the Fifth Circuit found that she was not a U.S. citizen. She returned to the U.S. in 2007 and obtained a passport, listing her place of birth as New Mexico. In 2008, the passport was confiscated by Border Patrol, but it was never revoked. She was released pending investigation. In 2011, DHS informed her that she was not a citizen. When she arrived in St. Thomas after a cruise, she told immigration officers that she was a U.S. citizen and presented her New Mexico driverâs license and a copy of her U.S. passport. Moreno was charged with falsely representing herself to be a citizen, 18 U.S.C. 911. On the night before trial, the government disclosed a DHS report concluding that the passport was valid but recommending investigation into her citizenship. Moreno did not accept a continuance. The district court did not admit the documents into evidence, finding that the non-exculpatory information had been previously disclosed. The court also declined to admit an FBI report, listing her citizenship as âoeUnited States,â and rejected an argument that the passport was conclusive evidence of citizenship. Moreno was sentenced to 29 months. The Third Circuit affirmed, holding that under 22 U.S.C. 2705, a passport constitutes conclusive proof of citizenship only if issued to a U.S. citizen.
Based on the 1978 strangling death of a 74-year-old, Schad was convicted in 1985 of first-degree murder and sentenced to death. After extensive Arizona state and federal court proceedings, the Supreme Court denied petitions for certiorari and for rehearing. Schad immediately moved for a stay pending the Ninth Circuit’s decision in a separate en banc case The Ninth Circuit denied the motion, stating that an indefinite stay “would unduly interfere with Arizona’s execution process,” but also declined to issue its mandate as normally required by Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 41(d)(2)(D). The court instead, sua sponte, construed Schad’s motion as a motion to reconsider a motion that it had denied six months earlier and remanded to the district court. Arizona then set an execution date. Based on its review of that previously rejected motion, the Ninth Circuit issued a stay a few days before Schad’s scheduled execution. The Supreme Court granted Arizona’s petition to vacate the stay and remanded with instructions to issue the mandate immediately, without any further proceedings. The Ninth Circuit did not demonstrate that exceptional circumstances justified withholding its mandate; its failure to issue its mandate constituted an abuse of discretion.
Sekhar was convicted of attempted extortion under the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. 1951(a). The Act defines “extortion” as “the obtaining of property from another, with his consent, induced by wrongful use of actual or threatened force, violence, or fear, or under color of official right.” The jury specified that the property at issue was the general counsel’s recommendation to approve an investment. The Second Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed. Attempting to compel a person to recommend that his employer approve an investment does not constitute “the obtaining of property from another” under the Hobbs Act. Congress generally intends to incorporate the well-settled meaning of the common-law terms it uses. (Note: It does?) Extortion historically required the obtaining of items of value, typically cash, from the victim. The Act’s text requires not only deprivation, but the acquisition of property; the property, therefore, must be transferable. No fluent English-speaker would say that “petitioner obtained and exercised the general counsel’s right to make a recommendation,” any more than he would say that a person “obtained and exercised another’s right to free speech.”
Kebodeaux was convicted by special court-martial of a federal sex offense. After serving his sentence and receiving a bad-conduct discharge from the Air Force, he moved to Texas and registered as a sex offender. Congress later enacted the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA), requiring federal sex offenders to register in the states where they live, study, and work, 42 U.S.C. 16913(a). SORNA applies to offenders who, when SORNA became law, had completed their sentences. Kebodeaux moved within Texas and failed to update his registration. The federal government prosecuted him, and the district court convicted him under SORNA. The Fifth Circuit reversed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that SORNAâs registration requirements, as applied to Kebodeaux, fall within the scope of congressional authority under the Necessary and Proper Clause. Congress did not apply SORNA to an individual who was, before its enactment, âoeunconditionally released,â but to an individual already subject to federal registration requirements. SORNA somewhat modified registration requirements to which Kebodeaux was already subject, to make more uniform "a patchwork of federal and 50 individual state registration requirements." At the time of his offense and conviction, Kebodeaux was subject to the Wetterling Act, which imposed similar registration requirements and was promulgated under the Military Regulation Clause (Art. I, s. 8, cl. 14), and the Necessary and Proper Clause. The same power that authorized Congress to promulgate the Uniform Code of Military Justice and punish Kebodeauxâs crime also authorized Congress to make the civil registration requirement at issue a consequence of conviction. Imposing a civil registration requirement that would apply upon the release of an offender like Kebodeaux is âoeeminently reasonable,â as is assignment of a special role to the federal government in ensuring compliance with federal sex offender registration requirements.
Barnegat Light, Ocean County, New Jersey, NJ, Long Beach Island, LBI
Barnegat Lighthouse State Park, Barnegat Light, Ocean County, NJ
Hereford Inlet Memorial, Village of Anglesea, North Wildwood, NJ
Barnegat Lighthouse ("Old Barney"), Barnegat Lighthouse State Park, Barnegat Light, NJ
Hereford Inlet Lighthouse, Village of Anglesea, North Wildwood, NJ
Hereford Inlet Lighthouse Boat, Village of Anglesea, North Wildwood, NJ
Hereford Inlet Lighthouse Boat, North Wildwood, NJ
Absecon Lighthouse, Lighthouse Park, Atlantic City, NJ
Out To Pasture, Pennsville, NJ
Finns Point National Cemetery, Pennsville, NJ
Finns Point Rear Range Light, Pennsville, NJ
Cape May Lighthouse, Cape May, NJ
East Point Lighthouse, Heislerville, Cumberland County, NJ